伯克級驅逐艦存在嚴重缺陷

係唔係美國海軍唔夠船用，連咁新的伯克級都要入廠呢？

伯克級驅逐艦存在嚴重缺陷
星島日報 2007-12-31 國際 A19

美國海軍已證實，其艦隊內的「阿利‧伯克」級驅逐艦存在嚴重的結構缺陷。

美國海軍承認目前在役的51艘「阿利‧伯克」級驅逐艦由於在海上受到比原設想高的多地負載，存在結構屈曲。

花4.8億元補救

美國海軍系統工程部總工程師凱文麥科伊少將披露，美國海軍批准了一項6200萬美元(逾四點八億港元)的「艦艏增強改裝」計畫，以解決「甲板橫梁的局部彎曲」問題以及在該級驅逐艦的一些結構損傷問題。

據知情人士介紹，目前至少有三艘Flight IIA型「格瑞德利」號、「斑布里奇」號(DDG96)和「福里斯特舍曼」號(DDG98)完成了艦艏加強工作。

這個問題同樣也波及到了美國海軍的22艘「提康得羅加」巡洋艦。一位華盛頓國防專家稱之所以發生架構屈曲，是因為這些艦船使用的頻率比原設計的要大，而不是潛在的工程缺陷。

我潛艇首闖第一島鏈始末

又是知就笑死，唔知就嚇死的報道。

我潛艇首闖第一島鏈始末
新華澳報 2007-12-27 03 特稿 孫冬 陳曉

　　能不能秘密通過？　　一九七六年十二月，中央軍委正式批准人民海軍252潛艇突破第一島鏈首航西太平洋訓練的計劃。

　　東海艦隊某潛艇支隊副支隊長許志明接到中央軍委批准遠航訓練的命令，非常興奮，躺在床上幾乎一夜沒合眼，滿腦子都是「出航！出航！」252潛艇是首次遠航西太平洋，許志明肩上壓著千斤重擔。

　　為了執行好中央軍委命令，支隊制訂了三套預案，進行了三十多種緊急情況下預案的操練，從物質上、精神上、戰備上做好了一切準備。

　　十二月二十五日，一陣急促的警鈴響了。252潛艇滿懷遠征渴望，急速地駛向茫茫的大海。

　　時間過得很快，潛艇迎著風雨已經到了潛航點。一陣急促「速潛」鈴響了。所有人員進艙，所有艙口密封蓋關緊。潛艇開始注水，像條鯨魚似的潛入大海深處。

　　太平洋到底是個什麼樣？是溫柔還是暴躁？島鏈到底是個什麼樣？能一次打破封鎖穿越而過嗎？在海峽一帶不但布有雷達，而且有水下偵聽站，能不能秘密通過？……這一連串問題在許志明頭腦裏旋轉。他要一個個解開這些方程式。

　　第一炮──尋找島鏈出口

　　十二月三十一日淩晨，潛艇開始進入突破島鏈前偵察。

　　島鏈是指太平洋西部的阿留申群島、千島群島、日本列島、琉球群島、臺灣島、菲律賓群島等島嶼。它們排列成弧形，好像掛在太平洋脖子的一條珍珠項鏈，因此人們形象地叫它島鏈。

　　這些群島之間有許多寬窄不一的海峽通道。這些通道大部屬於國際航道，是我國進入太平洋的必經咽喉地帶。新中國成立以後很長一段時間內，西方一些資本主義國家對我採取敵視態度，紛紛在這些島嶼駐紮重兵，意欲戰時利用這些天然屏障，對我進行封鎖，平時也利用這些島鏈上的軍事設施，阻礙我國商船進出太平洋，以限制各國跟中國通商，在經濟上封鎖我國。我年輕的人民海軍被迫待在家裏，喪失了進入太平洋深處的機會。這一切，許志明和水兵們哪個不心急如焚。征服太平洋的夢他們不知做過多少回。

　　潛艇進入潛望深度。潛望鏡徐徐升出海面。許志明發現，天陰沉沉，海面有一層濃濃白霧，這給尋找島鏈帶來了困難。

　　四時許，航海長向許志明報告：「根據航跡儀顯示的數據，我艇離島鏈目標三十七海裏。」　　「測準艇位！」許志明命令。

　　這是關鍵的一環。在這墨黑的水中，完全憑海圖推算，而眼前這些航行資料多數是從外國翻譯過來的，誤差是難免的。許志明叫航海長採取增加時差定位密度的方法，選擇二十四個艇位，綜合修正誤差，提高精確度。大家都不約而同地把目光投到航海業務長李相勳的身上。出航前他就收集整理了幾大本海洋水文氣象資料，繪製了晝夜明暗圖、時差雙曲線導航和整個航行上的星空圖；還專門組織航海幹部學習、操練、熟悉島鏈水道及航行海區，反復研究準確定位、識別判明島鏈目標的方法。因此，他胸有成竹地說：「根據反復計算，現在我艇與航跡儀顯示的位置差兩海裏。」　　「保持航向，加強對目標的觀察！」許志明命令。他神情嚴肅，深知差錯絲毫，就會誤入歧途，茫茫大海一望無邊，只有靠科學的計算測定才能不迷航啊！

　　片刻之後，潛望鏡的鏡片上，隱隱約約地出現了一片模模糊糊的影子，經過雷達隱蔽測定，果然是島鏈那個要尋找的目標。指揮艙內，軍官們頓時充滿歡樂。

　　潛艇保持航向，像條長鯨，悄悄地朝島鏈目標駛去。

　　這對全艇官兵來說，尋到島鏈出口，是這次首航戰役的第一炮。這一炮打響了，士氣就會高，就會增強對自己能力的信心。

　　在蒸籠裏航行七小時終穿島鏈　　突然，軍士長滿頭大汗，緊張地跑到許志明跟前說：「許副支隊長，機械出故障了！」「啊！什麼故障？」許志明儘量保持冷靜。軍士長臉色陰沉地說：「兩台壓縮機水泵密封裝置漏水了。」「趕緊組織力量搶修，要快！」許志明又對機電長陳德躍說，「你去看看吧！」　　氣氛一下子緊張起來。誰都明白，潛艇只要有一點點故障，在高壓海水環境下，隨時都會發生意想不到的事情。眼下兩台空壓機同時出現故障，人們心情能不緊張嗎？

　　潛艇在慢速航行，時間在「滴答」聲中度過，大家的心在受著煎熬。四個小時之後，故障才排除，壓在人們心上的石頭才算落了地。

　　潛艇頂著暗流又艱難地航行著。艇長張鏗然連續下達三道命令：無線電保持靜默，艙內不准發生任何撞擊聲；節約用電，空調器、照明燈、電風扇全部停止使用；一天只做一次飯。這三道命令一下，各艙室溫度迅速上升為四十多攝氏度。艇員們從冬天一下子進入三伏天。許多人穿著背心褲頭，一動一身汗，就像生活在蒸籠裏。

　　主機艙裏溫度更高。輪機兵們守在機器旁，油光光的脊背上汗流如水。

　　指揮艙內軍官們在精心操作：有的用海圖推算，不時測算艇位；有的操縱著開關，注視縱傾和橫傾儀，保持著潛艇的平衡；有的注視著各種儀錶，掌握著潛艇各部位是否正常。許志明和張鏗然眼睛緊緊地盯著潛望鏡，搜尋著海面目標。

　　最緊張的是聲吶艙裏，這裏是唯一能偵聽到艇殼外面世界的地方。聲吶業務長坐在椅子上，監視著聲光屏上的動靜。那顆藍色的電子珠子「丁零」、「丁零」發出清脆的響聲，隨著聲吶的掃描情況，從左向右地運動著。一旦碰上潛艇前方海底或海面有什麼障礙和目標，藍珠子就會驚跳起來。

　　艇內一片沉默，沒有人大聲說話，只有機器聲有節奏地響著。經過七小時的航行，航程儀上終於跳出一組令人興奮的數碼：潛艇已穿越島鏈數十海裏了。252潛艇已經進入太平洋！

　　激動的歡呼聲此起彼落，經久不斷。許志明笑了。他看了看表，正好是十二月三十一日二十時整。

　　252潛艇突破島鏈，首航太平洋成功，打開了這扇長期對中國關閉的神秘的大門。從此，人民海軍掀起了到太平洋遠航訓練的高潮。繼252潛艇突破第一島鏈之後，271潛艇挺進第二島鏈，接著又是第三艘、第四艘……一艘艘潛艇潛入太平洋！

　　一九七七年一月二十四日淩晨，經過三十個晝夜遠航訓練的252潛艇進入祖國的領海線。透過潛望鏡，看到了模糊的島影，這是祖國的土地，許志明第一個喊出來：「祖國！我們遠航回來了！」 （孫冬 陳曉/文）

印航母艦載機摔了一半

航空母艦，不是人人可擁有的


印航母艦載機摔了一半
環球時報 2007-12-26 軍事 08 張學峰

本報特約記者張學峰

印度是亞洲第一個裝備航母的國家，也是亞洲唯一把航母用於實戰的國家。但是，作為航母戰鬥力的核心，印度海軍的“海鷂”艦載機卻頻頻墜落。24日，印度海軍又有一架“海鷂”戰鬥機在訓練中墜毀，這是印度海軍20年來墜毀的第17架同型戰機，使得印度海軍總數30架的“海鷂”戰機部隊，在非戰爭行動中就已折損過半。這已經直接影響到印度航母戰鬥群的戰鬥力。

“海鷂”垂直起降戰鬥機是英國宇航工業公司同美國公司合作，在英國“鷂”式垂直起降戰鬥機的基礎上研製的放大版本。該機可執行對空、對地、對海攻擊等任務。印度海軍於1983年引進了30架“海鷂”戰機，裝備在“維克蘭特”號和“維拉特”號航母上。但是，由於該機保障垂直起降和低速飛行的氣動力控制系統設計非常複雜，且操作控制比較麻煩，容易導致各種技術故障，經常發生技術飛行事故。

印度目前裝備的“維拉特”號航母選擇了垂直起降的“海鷂”戰鬥機，擔負航母編隊的防空、截擊和對地攻擊等重任。有分析認為此次事故即便不導致“海鷂”戰鬥機停飛，也會由於數量減少，難以維持“維拉特”號的正常戰備。

其實，“海鷂”戰鬥機存在的一些問題，印度海軍早已經注意到了。印度海軍認為“海鷂”戰鬥機有其無法克服的缺點，例如載彈量相對較小，航程短，不能進行超音速飛行等。正是這些缺點，大大限制了印度“維拉特”號航母的作戰能力。印度已經打算在未來服役的航母上使用先進的常規戰鬥機代替“海鷂”，為此，印度在引進俄羅斯“戈爾什科夫海軍上將”號航母時，同時引進了俄羅斯的米格-29K艦載機，未來的印度國產航母也將使用米格-29K艦載機。▲

報佳音

今年第一次參與教會的報佳音活動，感覺良好，主意很多，更被老婆擺上台，有機會為傳道部做點事。

記得張祥志那篇道，上帝對我們的旨意是什麼，我們有什麼條件去為主作工。

今次我找到回應的機會了。

你個頭活動

昨日頒獎禮，有一名得獎的女同學開心過頭，哭成淚人，一講說話就喊，晚上我同老婆講時，她提醒了我：中學時候的一個獎，分分鐘會改變了他的人生。

再有一個故事。頒獎禮當日，坐在我旁邊的監製，和我打過招呼，說想與另一位得獎學生合作，想直接聯絡他們。

回顧活動，雖然我參與不多，但看到班城大細路的成長，投入，看到“A勿事”被達著，看到活動可以持續兩屆，更重要，是看到不同的參加者透過活動，一顯身手，有比試和攞獎的機會，讓他們透過活動，建立了信心，加強對自己的肯定，甚至成為一個讓外界認識他們的 交流平台，讓他們有機會作更大的發展。

我不知道事後監製和那名得獎同學有無下文，我亦不知道今次的獎項對那位喊到不能收聲的女同學會會否因今次獎項而改變了自己一生。但我想到，活動為她們做夢的可能，對我來說，震撼已經足夠了。

日軍事專家意見值得聽取

日本軍事專家的看法與我們的愛好家相當一致，國家艦船的damage control，實在太差勁。尤記的渣古說的“深圳號是用明火煮食”食未？

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日軍事專家意見值得聽取
大公報 2007-12-20 大公評論(兩岸‧國際) A28 有話要說 樂毅

在某門戶網站看到一條新聞，題目為《日媒諷中國訪日軍艦防火能力很差，實戰經驗不強》。報道中說：日本雜誌《AERA》12月10日號剛剛刊登了一篇日本軍事專家田岡俊次登上我軍訪日軍艦後的記事文章，田岡登船參觀後發現，「各個房間的門扇皆為塗漆的合成板材，門框亦為木製，走廊和士官室鋪設化纖地毯」等等隨處可見的可燃物，從實戰經驗出發，強調與不燃性的日美軍艦相比，在損管方面的考慮多有欠缺。

並無諷刺意味

我將新聞反覆看了三遍，卻怎麼也沒有讀出所謂的「諷」意來。相反，我以為這位日本軍事專家田岡俊次先生的意見相當中肯，值得我們聽取。

雖說國人集體記憶中的「日本鬼子」基本都是指日本陸軍，但事實上，日本傳統上卻是一個海軍國家。中國則傳統上是一個陸軍國家。雖然不令人愉快，但自近代以來，日本海軍無疑一直就強於中國海軍，至今仍是。而且，日本海軍的作戰理念、軍事素養，在世界範圍內也一直是很先進、出色的。中日甲午之戰前，日本海軍認為艦速的重要性要大於艦炮的口徑。戰爭的結果證明了，他們是正確的。日俄之戰時，日本海軍以近戰全殲俄黑海艦隊於對馬海峽，被稱為近代以來，黃種人對白種人的第一次偉大勝利。二戰時，純從軍事角度上講，奇襲珍珠港等戰例在軍事史上也是可圈可點的。

田岡文章中稱，造成這個問題的原因，是由於「中國海軍缺乏在實戰中喪失多艘船艦及無數海軍官兵流血換來的經驗，因此這樣的觀念並不深刻。」這裡面何嘗有「諷」意，戰爭是最實打實的事，玩不得花活，耍不得面子。二戰時，由於日本缺乏鋼鐵，日本軍艦上有相當一部分的木製配件，在實戰中的確造成了喪失多艘船艦及無數海軍官兵流血的慘痛教訓。

恭維話可看淡些

別說這位日本軍事專家田岡先生的文章中並無諷意，就算他真是譏諷吧，只要他的意見正確，那我們也該接受。這總好過在真正戰爭中付出生命與失敗的代價吧

我們的傳統裡有一個很壞的傳統，那就是死要面子。中日甲午戰前，也曾有外國軍事專家對北洋海軍提出過直言不諱的批評，但誰都聽不進去。只是津津樂道於外媒及某些駐華武官、大使的漂亮話，什麼「亞洲第一海軍」、「世界第四海上軍事力量」云云的。結果戰事一開，東亞第一海軍力量卻被東亞第二海軍全殲了。喪權辱國，為天下笑。這樣的教訓難道還不深刻麼？

我明白，中日之間有情結，國人對於日本人的講話總是要格外敏感些。但即使是有情結，更健康的心態卻還是，對方的恭維話可以看淡一些，對方的批評意見則要越加的重視。無論在何年何月何地，只有重視、尊重對手，才可能超過對手，這都是顛撲不破的真理。

印度航母要換“美國鷹眼”

美國佬針對中國的意圖相當明顯，但印度的航母用到鷹眼，唔係掛？

獲得最先進預警機不想太依賴俄羅斯 印度航母要換“美國鷹眼”
環球時報 2007-12-19 軍事 08 馬俊 陳肇祥

本報特約記者陳肇祥本報記者馬俊

據印度媒體17日報道，印度即將獲得美國最先進的E-2D“先進鷹眼”預警機。這種美軍自己都還沒裝備的先進武器性能傲視亞洲，中國軍事專家戴旭認為，E-2D預警機屬於戰略武器，如果這筆交易能夠達成，這將是美印軍事合作上的重要突破。

美國給印度的“最大驚喜”

據印度多家媒體17日援引《印度戰略防務》雜誌的消息稱，印度海軍已就購買E-2D預警機一事嚮美國政府提出“驗貨申請表”(RFI)。該報道稱，盡管華盛頓方面目前還沒有批准，但之前已表態稱這種飛機“是可以嚮印度、埃及、新加坡和阿聯酋這樣的國家出售的”。《印度時報》則在報道標題里直接稱“美國將嚮印度提供E-2D先進預警機”，對這項交易的前景充滿信心。印度媒體認為，美國願意將本國海軍最新的系統同時提供給印度，這點很值得關注。華盛頓方面也表示“收到新德里的正式請求後，美國將予以積極答覆”。

其實印度海軍從2004年開始就嚮美國試探購買E-2系列預警機的可能性，當時印度只提出採購與美國海軍現役同級的E-2C“鷹眼”預警機，沒想到美國方面反應熱烈，直截了當地表示願意向印度提供更高級的E-2D“先進鷹眼”。

把印軍帶入“網絡中心戰”時代

別看E-2D與美海軍現役的E-2C預警機僅一字之差，兩者卻有天壤之別。據美國《每日航宇》介紹，E-2D“先進鷹眼”是一種擴展了預警和監視功能的全天候、雙引擎艦載飛機，是自1971年E-2C“鷹眼”預警機首飛以來最徹底的一次改進，它將於2011年進入美國海軍序列。

雖然兩者外觀相似，但E-2D內部設備幾乎完全是重新設計的。該機核心是新型APY-9電子掃描相控陣雷達，至少比E-2C的APS-145雷達先進兩代，而且它還擁有導彈預警定位能力，這必將延伸印度國家導彈防禦系統的探測範圍。對印度海軍而言，能夠上艦的E-2D預警機將實質性提高印度航母戰鬥群的遠程預警能力，印航母迄今只有少數俄製卡-31預警直升機，探測距離近且持續時間短，而E-2D加油後能飛行十多個小時，探測範圍也擴大數倍。而且它搭載的設備均實現聯網工作，數字化程度極高，它將一舉把印軍帶入“網絡中心戰”時代，這正是印軍夢寐以求的。

美國印度各有所圖

中國軍事專家戴旭18日在接受《環球時報》採訪時表示，美國嚮印度出售如此先進的預警機已不再是普通的軍火買賣，而是兩國在軍事戰略層面的重要突破。這筆交易如果成功，E-2D將是近年第一種加入印軍的美國戰機。美國希望能借機分化俄印在軍事合作上的密切關係。《印度時報》稱印度近來在與俄軍購方面接連受挫，對於俄方動輒提高要價很不滿，也希望通過與美國的合作擺脫對俄的依賴。

戴旭還認為，印度四處求購先進預警機顯示出它建立南亞地區空中霸權的野心。亞洲範圍內，日本、新加坡、台灣等都擁有多個型號的預警機，印度的老對手巴基斯坦也從瑞典訂購了“愛立眼”預警機。目前印度空軍早就租借了俄製A-50空中預警機，從以色列進口的“費爾康”預警機也即將交付。相比之下，印度的這兩種預警機在亞洲甚至全世界都已是先進機型。而如今印度還是不滿足，繼續尋求更先進的預警機，顯然是把目標鎖定在壓制中國和巴基斯坦的空中力量。▲

我們培養了什麼人才？

香港的教育制度，對幾多分以上的人有利呢。文章給我們一個研究教育公平的新角度，還有是香港比新加坡是優勝的。

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我們培養了什麼人才？
聯合早報 (新加坡) 2007-12-19 消息站╱新加坡新聞 10 潘星華


《邁嚮使命的歷程—新加坡教育50年》勾勒了新加坡從建國到成長，教育工作者在每個階段的奮進。建國不到50年，新加坡得以從第三世界走進第一世界，配合時代需求的務實教育政策發揮了重大作用。時代需要什麼人，學校就培養什麼人，畢業生學以致用，社會井井有條、欣欣嚮榮。21世紀的教育政策是否需要換角度去審視？

然而，在新加坡需要再嚮前跨步的21世紀，一向被人稱頌的教育政策，是否也需要換另外一個角度去審視？

上月我訪問華裔諾貝爾獎得主楊振寧教授，他談到中美教育差異時說：“我一向認為中國的社會、環境、教育哲學、教育體制，對60分至85分能力的孩子是好的。它可以使這樣的人變得有用，成才，長大後能朝正規的方向發展。中國這幾十年的建設，和這樣的系統有密切關係。但是，美國的社會、環境和教育，整個系統，對95分以上能力的人特別有利，因為它採取放任的態度。放任對多數人不利，可非常聰明的尖端人才，卻需要放任帶給他們自由發揮的空間。” 楊振寧談中國教育的話，對新加坡也合用。當新加坡需要再嚮前挪步的時候，如何培養95分以上的尖子？令人深思。

新加坡在過去50年，究竟培養了什麼人才？是不是正因為教育政策太配合時代需求，少了前瞻性，結果只培養出了“師”字輩的人才，如律師、工程師、會計師、建築師、醫師、教師、設計師、技師，卻沒有培養出“家”字輩的頂級人才。我們有哪位是世界級的文學家、科學家、設計家、教育家、藝術家、企業家？

新加坡每年95分以上的優秀生獲得各種獎學金，送到世界頂尖大學深造。這些人畢業後，除了要求他們回國成為一流公務員、一流“師”字輩人才，是否還能要求有更高成就？

在新加坡人但求溫飽，為生存而奮鬥的工業化年代，每個工作崗位有合適的人到位，就已經很不錯。所以，我們一直有分流制度，按學生學術成績分檔次培養，再分到各個崗位去，有條不紊。工藝教育學院培養技工、理工學院培養督工、大學培養工程師。這在跨國公司林立的時代是受用的，因為跨國公司的老闆來自外國，我們不需要培養老闆。

然而，當中國經濟崛起，成為世界工廠，跨國公司紛紛撤離的時候，新加坡已經到了要自己培養老闆，組成自己的跨國公司，嚮世界進軍，就發現單單培養“師”字輩的人才，並沒有駕馭世界的能力。未來需要什麼樣的人才？

香港“培正中學”是一所世界知名中學。它是華文中學，培養了諾貝爾物理獎得主崔琦、世界數學界最高榮譽費爾茲獎得主丘成桐、美國AT&T公司與朗訊科技公司貝爾實驗室半導體研究所所長卓以和、哈佛大學數學系系主任蕭蔭堂、三藩市州立大學校長吳家瑋（美國首位華裔大學校長）、特拉華州副州長吳仙標（美國首位華裔副州長），音樂家馬思聰、指揮家石信之、香港財政司司長唐英年，前新華社社長毛鈞年、香港浸會大學校長吳清輝、浸會大學前任校長謝志偉。就連香港的知名導演王晶、關錦鵬，都是培正畢業生。

新加坡呢？

新加坡教育走過50年，這是靜下來好好回顧並且前瞻的時刻：我們的未來，需要什麼樣的人才？該怎樣培養？

Winning Asia Washington's Untold Success Story

Yes, Bush do a good job in Asia, depsite he fails in Middle East and elsewhere....

Winning Asia Washington's Untold Success Story By Victor D. Cha
From Foreign Affairs , November/December 2007
Summary: Pundits, academics, and Bush bashers insist that the United States is losing ground in Asia, but they are wrong. The Bush administration's Asia policy has been an unheralded success. Improved relations with China, stronger U.S.-Japanese cooperation, North Korea's gradual nuclear disarmament, and expanding regional alliances have made Asia more prosperous and secure than it has been in decades.
VICTOR D. CHA is D. S. Song Professor and Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University. He served as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007 and as Deputy Head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks from 2006 to 2007.
Inside the Beltway and on op-ed pages across the United States, it has become increasingly popular to lament the demise of U.S. influence in Asia. Power transitions, resurgent Asian nationalism, and poor policy choices in Washington have supposedly undermined U.S. leadership in Asia. According to critics, the Bush administration has been distracted by Iraq, has failed to deal adequately with China's economic and political rise, and has alienated many Asians with its singular focus on counterterrorism. The lack of U.S. leadership after the Cold War, detractors charge, has made Asia ripe for conflict.
But the conventional wisdom is wrong. The United States' position in Asia is now stronger than ever, and Asia remains at peace. The United States has achieved a pragmatic, results-oriented, cooperative relationship with China, and it has expanded and strengthened its alliance with Japan just as Tokyo and Beijing are improving their bilateral relations. This confluence of events has created an emerging U.S.-Chinese-Japanese partnership that greatly enhances regional stability. Washington has also improved its defense relationship with South Korea and successfully facilitated the shutdown of North Korea's bomb-making capabilities through the six-party talks. Finally, the United States has steadily improved its relations with Southeast Asian nations, largely by building on the goodwill it created by leading the humanitarian response to the tsunami in 2004. (a victory of the gunship diplmoacy???)
Few commentators in Japan, South Korea, or the United States will give any credit to the Abe, Roh, and Bush administrations for these accomplishments. Rather than conceding that the Bush administration has made progress, naysayers in Washington tend to attribute Asia's good fortune to benign neglect while the administration's neoconservatives were busy focusing on Iraq. But they are wrong. President George W. Bush's Asia policy has worked.
WHO'S ASIA'S DADDY
Contrary to the dire warnings issued by many Asia pessimists, China is not eating the United States' lunch in Asia. Beijing is indeed building its military capabilities, pressing for free-trade agreements, and increasingly occupying central positions in various regional organizations. But those who argue that these moves signal a power transition, whereby China is displacing the United States as the region's new benefactor, are mistaken. A power transition may come to Asia someday, but not anytime soon.
Critics who predict an American sunset in Asia are missing a fundamental point: in order to be a region's benefactor, a leading power must be willing and able to provide for the region's public good. After World War II, the United States became the world's undisputed leader, first by providing markets for the recovering European and Asian economies but also by offering international security. Today, China offers a vast market to other Asian countries, but it has not proved itself as a provider of public goods. Beijing's response to the 2004 tsunami, for example, which killed 280,000 people and displaced over 1.8 million, was slow, feeble, and parochial (China initially provided only $60 million and one medical team). Meanwhile, within 48 hours of the disaster, the United States had enlisted Australia, India, and Japan and organized the largest emergency relief mission in modern history. It sent over 16,000 U.S. military personnel, two dozen ships, and 100 aircraft as part of its immediate $346 million relief package, followed by an additional U.S. commitment of $600 million. This rapid response gave UN agencies both the time and the infrastructure they needed to mobilize and get on the ground. No other nation, and no international organization, could have coordinated such a response. Faced with a crisis of unprecedented magnitude, the world reflexively turned to the United States for leadership. Whether the United States covets this role or not, it is still the only true leader in Asia.
WASHINGTON'S NEW COMRADES
Far from being supplanted by China, the United States is enlisting Beijing's help. The Bush administration's China policy, which was once confrontational, has evolved into a hard-nosed but cooperative dialogue. Its goal is to turn China into a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system, as Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank and former deputy secretary of state, has put it. The Chinese leadership has welcomed this effort because it demonstrates the United States' acceptance of China's rightful place in the world, implies that China's growth is not threatening, and leads to cooperation on numerous global issues. The respect accorded to China through the stakeholder concept has allowed Washington to raise difficult issues such as democratic values. Because the United States is not imposing its values, China seems more open to discussing the need for greater political liberties as it seeks its proper place in the world.
This effort has paid off. High-level diplomatic talks, led by Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and his Chinese counterpart, Dai Bingguo, have produced cooperation on counterproliferation efforts, such as those aimed at North Korea and Iran, and on devising a post-Kyoto climate policy that focuses on programs that are both energy efficient and pro-growth rather than on unrealistic reductions of emissions. The dialogue has been less successful on human rights and China's policy toward Africa, but U.S. persuasion and the spotlight of the Beijing Olympics are likely to compel changes over the coming year. The U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, led by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, which seeks to manage difficult issues such as currency valuation and intellectual property rights, has made some progress. The yuan has appreciated by 9.4 percent since mid-2005, and Beijing is beginning to clamp down on software piracy. Tensions with China over trade remain high: 27 percent of current U.S. antidumping orders apply to Chinese goods, the U.S. trade representative has authorized four cases against China in the World Trade Organization since last year, and Congress is threatening to slap tariffs on all goods made in China. Nevertheless, these talks signal a U.S. commitment to manage trade tensions through negotiations, rather than through trade wars.
Discussions between President Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao constitute the least formal but most important aspect of U.S.-Chinese relations. From early on, the Bush White House understood that the most effective way to get things done in China was to go to the very top. When agreements are made at this level, both sides take their commitments very seriously. For this reason, the administration worked to cultivate relations with Hu and his predecessor, Jiang Zemin. This channel was particularly important in garnering support for a firm UN Security Council response to Pyongyang's October 2006 nuclear test and in setting the diplomatic course toward the agreement last February that shut down North Korea's only known operating nuclear reactor.
The strength of the U.S.-Chinese relationship pays dividends in quiet but critical ways. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has been pushing the envelope on independence in the run-up to the March 2008 elections in Taiwan (for example, Taipei recently applied for UN membership), yet China has not responded militarily because it is confident that Washington considers such antics a risk to peace in the region. Similarly, Beijing has remained conspicuously quiet about former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's much-publicized steps to upgrade Japan's military capabilities. China's poise stems from the current healthy state of U.S.-Chinese relations and an overarching fear of Japanese rearmament without the United States' presence as Tokyo's security guarantor. When U.S.-Chinese ties are strained, Beijing sees U.S.-Japanese cooperation as an effort to contain China, but when U.S.-Chinese relations are good, Beijing tends to view the U.S.-Japanese alliance as a check on Japan's regional ambitions. Today's goodwill has resulted in unexpected U.S.-Chinese-Japanese cooperation, which stabilizes Asia. The United States still talks tough about China's arms buildup (which is intended to intimidate Taiwan), expanding defense budget, and drive for an antisatellite capability. But today, these difficult discussions constitute only one part, rather than the entirety, of the relationship.
JAPAN'S GLOBAL ALLIANCE
The U.S.-Japanese alliance has reached an unprecedented level of intimacy. Beginning in his first term, President Bush chose to reinvest in Japan as the United States' key ally in Asia and to overhaul its military posture there. This base realignment -- the most significant in 30 years -- includes moving 7,000-10,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam, transplanting dangerously congested facilities in Okinawa to less populated areas, and creating joint training facilities in Guam. The changes will enable greater interoperability between the two militaries, give the United States more mobility in the Pacific (thanks partly to a U.S. nuclear carrier based at Yokosuka), and reduce civil-military tensions with Japanese host communities, thereby ensuring long-term domestic support for the alliance.
Washington and Tokyo are also advocating a "global alliance" that would focus on common values such as liberal democracy, free-market economics, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. As a result, Japan has taken unprecedented steps into the international arena. It has deployed ground forces in Iraq for humanitarian operations, flown C-130 supply missions, and become the second-largest donor to Iraqi reconstruction, with an assistance package valued at nearly $5 billion. In support of coalition forces in Afghanistan, Japan has deployed two naval vessels in the Indian Ocean, which provide critical water and refueling services. At the Bush-Abe summit last April, Tokyo committed to continuing its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as stepping up assistance to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in eastern Pakistan, a suspected al Qaeda haven. Japan has also joined the United States in efforts to improve the business climate in Indonesia and supported France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in nuclear negotiations with Iran. These are hugely important and unprecedented steps by Japan, and they represent a new norm in Japanese foreign policy.
As Japan expands its security profile to become more of a global player, it is doing so wholly within the context of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which acts as a constraint on more ambitious Japanese rearmament. This should be comforting to other states in the region. Moreover, both Abe's October 2006 visit to Beijing and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's wildly popular visit to Japan last April helped thaw Chinese-Japanese relations, which had turned chilly under Abe's predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. Historically, Asian states have become concerned whenever the United States has grown close to Japan in order to contain China or close to China at the expense of traditional U.S. allies and smaller regional powers. The situation today -- a cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship, a strong U.S.-Japanese alliance, and good relations between Japan and China -- is a viable equilibrium.
BUSH LOST KOREA?
The situation is similarly hopeful on the Korean Peninsula. Five years ago, policy wonks, pundits, and academics on both the right and the left were openly predicting the end of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Anti-American demonstrations in the streets of Seoul in 2002 and the election of the leftist Roh Moo-hyun as president in 2003 suggested that the two allies were drifting further and further apart. Critics blamed Bush for branding North Korea part of the "axis of evil" and thereby encouraging young South Koreans to view the United States as a greater threat to peace than North Korea. They predicted that Bush would botch the policy toward the Korean Peninsula entirely -- losing an ally in the South and the nonproliferation battle in the North.
However, these gloomy predictions have not come true. Washington and Seoul have made significant strides in improving relations. The allies have agreed on a major base-restructuring agreement that includes the return of over 60 U.S. camps to the South Koreans, the relocation of U.S. Army headquarters away from the center of Seoul, and the return of wartime operational control to South Korea by 2012. The two governments also defied all expectations by signing a far-reaching free-trade agreement (FTA) in June 2007. South Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner, with trade between the two countries valued annually at over $78 billion, making this the largest bilateral FTA ever signed by the United States. Despite some congressional opposition, the accord will likely be ratified given that Congress has never undermined an FTA negotiated by the U.S. government.
On the diplomatic front, the White House has overseen the creation of an informal but highly effective channel between the two countries' national security councils and the creation of a formal new dialogue between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her South Korean counterpart. These changes have expanded the scope of the U.S.-South Korean alliance beyond the peninsula to other areas of mutual global concern. Much like Japan, South Korea has become an important coalition partner in Iraq. It has provided the third-largest contingent of troops there, performing tasks ranging from humanitarian operations to protective missions for U.S. and UN agencies. South Koreans are also providing medical and logistical support in Afghanistan -- where they have been targeted by Taliban terrorists -- and participating in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. This state of affairs is a far cry from the doomsday scenarios announced five years ago.
Likewise, the situation in North Korea today appears to be progressing, even though the nuclear standoff with Pyongyang has not been resolved. The United States has worked with China, Japan, both Koreas, and Russia to create a denuclearization road map, embodied in a September 2005 joint statement and the February 2007 implementation agreement. In July 2007, North Korea shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility, which it had used to make plutonium for nuclear bombs. In addition, it admitted inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the facility for the first time in five years. The aim of the six-party talks is to obtain a full declaration of nuclear materials from Pyongyang (including highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and nuclear devices) and the disablement of all North Korean nuclear facilities and activities by the end of 2007. Meeting this interim objective would bring North Korea closer to disarmament than it has ever been. The ultimate goal is to permanently dismantle all nuclear facilities and the existing weapons by the end of 2008. In return, North Korea would receive energy assistance and the United States and Japan would begin to normalize relations with North Korea, with a view toward final-status peace talks.
Despite progress toward these goals, critics outside the U.S. government and across the political spectrum charge that the Bush administration has acted unilaterally and inconsistently in its policy toward Pyongyang. In the eyes of liberals, Bush erred by labeling North Korea "evil" and pursuing a policy of "regime change" that failed to pressure Kim Jong Il into obedience and therefore led to the October 2006 nuclear test. Conservatives, led by former UN Ambassador John Bolton, criticize Bush for being inconsistent. In their view, the administration had the right get-tough mindset for dealing with Pyongyang but unwisely gave up its strong financial instruments and a UN Security Council resolution pressuring Kim to temporarily shut down Yongbyon -- even though the latter would have been only a symbolic victory guaranteeing nothing in terms of validating North Korea's denuclearization intentions.
These criticisms mistake tactical shifts for inconsistent strategy. Despite the charges of inconsistency and a directionless policy, voiced most recently by Michael Mazarr in these pages, three core principles have systematically guided U.S. policy toward North Korea over the past seven years. First, the United States has remained committed to a peaceful diplomatic solution. Despite speculation that the Bush administration has seriously considered coercive options and regime change, peaceful diplomacy was always considered the only practical solution. No high-level White House official ever advocated or presented the option of regime change to any Asian counterpart.
Second, Washington has long believed that the North Korean nuclear problem must be handled through a multilateral approach. After the breakdown of the 1994 U.S.-North Korean nuclear agreement, U.S. policymakers insisted that key regional players with material influence over North Korea be involved, especially China. Beijing's hosting of the six-party talks has forced China to take ownership of the problem. Indeed, China's own reputation has come to depend on its ability to bring about nuclear disarmament in North Korea. At each critical point in the crisis, U.S.-Chinese cooperation has been vital. The Chinese lent unprecedented support to UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, which imposed economic sanctions and a luxury-goods ban on Pyongyang after it conducted missile and nuclear tests in 2006. In addition, the Chinese government and the Chinese military establishment turned a cold shoulder to North Korea after the tests, and Beijing has since pressured Pyongyang in material ways that do not show up in trade figures but have had a real impact. Any future U.S. administration would be wise to ensure that China stays tough on North Korea.
The third principle behind U.S. policy has been to negotiate with the purpose of testing North Korea's intent to dismantle its nuclear program. A popular criticism is that U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill was given the green light to negotiate seriously only after Pyongyang's nuclear test. This does not accurately reflect the record of past U.S. diplomatic outreach to North Korea. As early as October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted North Korea about its covert acquisition of materials consistent with the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium. He explained how denuclearization could bring it a more fruitful economic and political relationship with the United States. In the course of 2004, North Korea stalled and then rejected a proposal by the United States, Japan, and South Korea to trade denuclearization for security assurances. In September 2005, Pyongyang accepted a similar deal that included the promise of energy assistance and the possibility of diplomatic normalization. Since the resulting September 2005 joint statement, which declared that North Korea would "abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs," the Bush administration's singular focus has been to test whether Pyongyang is serious about this commitment. In this spirit, secret meetings between the United States and North Korea were held in Berlin earlier this year, leading to February's implementation agreement.
Conservatives in Washington, led by Bolton, were outraged in May when the Bush administration agreed to release $25 million of North Korea's frozen assets held at Banco Delta Asia in Macao. Pyongyang refused to shut down the Yongbyon reactor until it received these funds, and critics saw the concession as a sign of weakness from an administration distracted by Iraq and desperate for a foreign policy victory. But in fact, this decision was another sign of Washington's unusual political will and patience in pursuing a long-term goal: moving beyond a temporary IAEA-monitored shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and permanently disabling the facility.
The United States may engage in normalization talks with North Korea or discussions involving China and both Koreas on a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War, but it will not conclude either of these discussions without complete nuclear disarmament. Conservatives should rest assured: no U.S. administration, Republican or Democratic, will normalize relations or conclude a peace treaty with a North Korea that is a nuclear weapons state. Bush administration officials have not suddenly become wide-eyed optimists when it comes to North Korea; they have pursued a systematic diplomatic strategy designed to test Pyongyang's intentions. If Pyongyang proves to be serious, then the six-party forum can move on to the final phase of nuclear dismantlement in 2008. But if Pyongyang does not implement the most recent agreement, the other five parties must be prepared to adopt tougher measures.
ASIA'S NEW REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE
Over the past several years, a U.S. vision for a new regional architecture has begun to take root. It has none of the fanfare of organizations such as the East Asian Summit, which is a new regional structure in search of a purpose. The U.S. view on regional organizations in Asia has always been driven by results rather than rhetoric. The U.S. plan -- although less formal and more incremental -- involves deep engagement with Southeast Asian states, a security system in Northeast Asia, and a network of interconnecting bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral institutions to deal with security problems. Academics steeped in power transition theory, which holds that rising powers and declining powers are prone to conflict when their capabilities converge, might argue that these U.S. efforts clash with Chinese aspirations in Southeast Asia. But in fact the opposite is true. Washington looks forward to China's assuming a major role as a real problem solver in the region.
Skeptics complain that the United States' fixation on its bilateral alliance structure is "prehistoric" and stands at odds with efforts to build Asian multilateralism. But when the 2004 tsunami put hundreds of thousands of lives at risk, the only response that worked was a multilateral relief effort fashioned by the United States in conjunction with its allies Australia, India, and Japan. Not bad for a dinosaur.
U.S. alliances in Asia are a necessary part of the future regional architecture. But the United States is branching out to create new multilateral structures. The largest and most well established of these networks is the six-party talks, which are chaired by China. This is the first multilateral security forum in Northeast Asia, and its members hope that it will become the basis of a broader Northeast Asian peace and security regime that would include a four-party forum to discuss a formal end to the Korean War. Canberra has promoted a U.S.-Japanese-Australian strategic dialogue to address issues such as missile defense, nuclear proliferation, maritime piracy, climate change, damage to the environment, disaster relief, and UN reform. In a similar vein, former Prime Minister Abe personally proposed to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, and President Bush the idea of a quadrilateral grouping of their countries focused on disaster preparedness and relief. At the September Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Sydney, Australia, President Bush proposed the formation of an Asia-Pacific democracy partnership, to involve these four countries as well as Canada, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea.
The United States remains committed to existing regional organizations as well. Washington has recently doubled its financial commitment to APEC, the premier institution in the region devoted to trade liberalization, sustainable development, the environment, and security. Critics, such as the new secretary-general of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Surin Pitsuwan, contend that the United States' focus on counterterrorism has led to alienation between the United States and ASEAN members, but they are about three years behind the curve. U.S. policy immediately after 9/11 did indeed focus on counterterrorism -- and succeeded in disrupting planned terrorist attacks and the operations of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and other organizations sympathetic to al Qaeda in Southeast Asia and in saving an untold number of American, Filipino, and Indonesian lives. But any serious analyst will notice that more recently the United States has avoided an exclusive focus on counterterrorism and has bolstered its engagement with ASEAN. President Bush inaugurated an annual meeting of ASEAN leaders and met with them for the third time at this year's APEC conference. He has also created a U.S.-ASEAN enhanced partnership to address issues ranging from drug trafficking to good governance. To expand trade with the region, Washington has created a network of bilateral FTAs and trade and investment agreements with Singapore and other ASEAN nations. Last year, Washington surprised critics and supporters alike by announcing a U.S. commitment to building a free-trade area of the Asia-Pacific region.
The United States also signed a strategic framework agreement on security cooperation with Singapore in 2004 and utterly transformed its ties with Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami by resuming comprehensive military-to-military ties and launching a $156 million education initiative. Washington led a multilateral effort in 2005 to contain avian influenza throughout East Asia (including in Myanmar, also called Burma) and to cope with HIV/AIDS in Vietnam. U.S.-Vietnam relations were bolstered by President Bush's visit to Hanoi in November 2006 and the recent visit of President Nguyen Minh Triet to Washington. The Bush administration has declared Thailand and the Philippines major non-NATO allies and continues to provide top-quality military training to several Southeast Asian countries.
In a quiet and unassuming way, the Bush administration has left Asia in good shape. So much for those academics, such as Paul Bracken, Kent Calder, and Aaron Friedberg, who once predicted that Asia would be a cauldron of conflict after the Cold War. Those predicting regional rivalry in Asia never anticipated Washington's adaptability and the centrality of U.S. alliances in Asia's new architecture. In addition to strong U.S. engagement with ASEAN and APEC, the new regional architecture is a patchwork of overlapping and interconnecting bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral relationships and five- and six-party networks. Bush bashers do not give the administration enough credit, nor even acknowledge that it has followed a consistent strategy. But few would be willing to trade the current situation in Asia for that of any other period in recent history.
CAMPAIGNING AGAINST ASIA
Unfortunately, there is a real risk that the situation could deteriorate. The presidential primary season in the United States threatens to disrupt the delicate balance that Washington has created in Asia. The candidates' views are already gravitating to two extremes. Republicans are focusing on China's alleged attempt to displace the United States in Asia and the threat China poses to Taiwan. On the Republican side of the aisle, discussions of cooperation with Beijing will likely be overtaken by discussions of China's defense budget, missile buildup, growing submarine fleet, and antisatellite capabilities. At the other extreme are the trade protectionists. They focus on China's $233 billion trade surplus with the United States, its $1 trillion-plus reserves of foreign exchange, its undervalued currency, the inadequate quality of its exports, and the perceived threat China poses to U.S. workers. Pending legislation proposes to designate China as a currency manipulator and slap a uniform tariff on all Chinese goods sold in the United States unless it dramatically revalues its currency. Democratic presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and John Edwards have already opposed the FTA with South Korea in an effort to play to campaign crowds in the Midwest, where people fear the loss of more manufacturing jobs.
This electoral posturing could have unintended consequences: in Asia, a polarized debate in the United States could be viewed as the new reality. Beijing's impression that President Bush is a lame duck, coupled with the harsh tone on the campaign trail, may prompt Chinese leaders to ignore the Bush White House and focus on laying down some markers with the next U.S. administration. They may, for example, abandon their restrained position on Taiwan and revert to the aggressive behavior of the past. Faced with an environment of disintegrating U.S.-Chinese relations, Beijing might also feel the need to openly oppose any attempt by a future Japanese government to expand Japan's military.
Before any lasting damage is done, debates on Asia need to move back to a pragmatic political center instead of being driven by alarmists on the left and the right. It will be incumbent on the new administration, Democratic or Republican, to keep Asia on an even keel by building on the accomplishments of the Bush White House. Its guiding principle should be that U.S. and Asian interests are best advanced when the parties invest in their bilateral alliances based on common values, pursue free and fair trade, and enlist regional partners for multilateral solutions to difficult security problems.
For example, the United States must maintain the balance between its pragmatic working relationship with China and its deepening cooperation with Japan. With China, it will need to forge a broad-based relationship in which it can have a tough dialogue with Beijing on military issues but at the same time push China to contribute to resolving global problems such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, and ballooning energy needs. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to encourage Japan to step up its international involvement, as Japan has done in Afghanistan and Iraq, while quietly pressing for more deregulation and economic reform, which has helped spur Japan's economic recovery.
A key component of U.S. leadership in Asia is Washington's support of free trade. The next administration will need to continue supporting current FTAs in the region and seek the renewal of fast-track trade promotion authority in order to negotiate new ones, including multilateral FTAs that could pave the way toward a regionwide free-trade zone. FTAs with Australia, Singapore, and, most recently, South Korea have increased U.S. exports -- from dog food to airplanes -- to Asia. Yet Congress is opposing ratification of the South Korean FTA, and presidential candidates are pandering to campaign crowds in opposing it too. The fact is that breaking down trade barriers in Asia (particularly in the service sector, which accounts for some 80 percent of U.S. GDP) will help the U.S. service and industrial sectors expand their global market share; while this will lead to new jobs in Asia, many will be created in the United States as well. Without these FTAs, the United States will operate at a comparative disadvantage as the European Union and China negotiate their own agreements in Asia.
The next administration should also turn the six-party forum into an embryonic Northeast Asian peace and security regime. The first critical step in this regard would be the creation of a Northeast Asian security charter -- a statement of core security principles, norms, and understandings about the promotion of peace and prosperity. These principles should include mutual respect for sovereignty, support for a nonnuclear region (with the exception of China and Russia), and a commitment to strive for pragmatic cooperation despite historical animosities.
The next U.S. president can contribute to Asia's new architecture by continuing to support both U.S. bilateral alliances and regional multilateral organizations in order to reduce tension and build confidence. Three initiatives would be especially useful: a U.S.-Japanese-South Korean discussion regarding the transfer of operational control over U.S. and South Korean forces to Seoul, base realignments, and a possible Seoul-Tokyo security declaration; a U.S.-Chinese-Japanese forum to discuss Japan's national security agenda and China's military budget; and a U.S.-Chinese-South Korean forum to discuss the future of the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, the next administration needs to allot the appropriate time to meet with Southeast Asian leaders. As both Bill Clinton and Bush showed during their trips to Asia, the payoff of face-to-face diplomacy is huge in terms of goodwill and support for the U.S. agenda. Finally, the United States should not be bashful about discussing the values it shares with Asia and promoting Bush's proposed Asia-Pacific democracy partnership (with China as an observer). Although such topics have been declared too controversial in the past, times have changed. Some of the world's most successful democratic transitions have taken place in Asia, including in South Korea and Indonesia, and even China acknowledges the relevance of democratic ideas to its own rise in the world. The United States should encourage the view that the trend toward democracy is inexorable.
Bush bashers have made good sport of criticizing every aspect of the current administration's policies. Yet Asia has now discovered a long-sought formula for stability that includes engaged U.S. leadership, constructive U.S.-Chinese-Japanese cooperation, and a commitment to free trade. These detractors should abandon their universal condemnation of the White House and admit that the Bush administration's record in Asia is far better than its record elsewhere.

深圳號訪日始末

廣州日報 A08 By 竇豐昌 柯學東 關家玉
2007-12-18
標示關鍵字

“深圳”號訪日始末
“特級艦長朱建達接受本報記者專訪描繪首度訪日連串細節 ●出訪前指揮員看《大國崛起》
●途中遇台灣艦隊和美國航母
●日本“老八路”登船潸然淚下
●我海軍順路到日“雷”號摸底 12月14日，本報記者登上中國南海艦隊“深圳”號驅逐艦。這艘一周前才回到湛江麻斜軍港的軍艦，靜靜地停靠在湛江軍港的碼頭上，士兵們仍一如既往地吃穿在艦上。對他們來說，半個月前對日本的訪問已經過去，現在他們正為自己分內的任務忙碌。11月28日～12月1日，“深圳”號導彈驅逐艦對日本進行了為期四天的訪問。對於“深圳”號來講，雖然這只是多次出訪當中的一次，但這次卻實現了中日建交以來中國艦艇訪日零的突破。中日海軍軍官的雙手握在一起的那個瞬間，開啟了一個序幕———自中華人民共和國成立以來，懸掛五星紅旗的中國軍艦首次到訪日本本土。從南中國海的湛江港到日本的東京灣，“深圳”號駛過了中日關係史上一段不平凡的航程，也駛入了中日兩國防務領域交流的一個新階段。
文/圖本報記者竇豐昌、柯學東、關家玉通訊員李根成(除署名外)
上周五，在“深圳”號驅逐艦的甲板上，就這次不尋常的軍事訪問，本報記者專訪了“深圳”號艦長朱建達。
名副其實的外交“明星艦”
有25年的軍齡，朱建達精幹而又不失儒雅。採訪的過程中，他領記者全程參觀了“深圳”號，從駕駛室，到作戰指揮室，到反潛直升機庫，直到普通的士兵臥室。
他說，“深圳”號被譽為“神州第一艦”，是我國20世紀90年代自行研製的噸位較大、科技含量和現代化程度較高的導彈驅逐艦。由於帶有試驗性質，該級艦船僅造了一艘。自1999年4月起開始服役的“深圳”號，長154米，最大寬度17.1米,排水量6100噸，艦上裝備有現代化的各型導彈、雷達和聲吶，還配備有直升機，擁有強大的綜合作戰能力，可執行對海攻擊、防空、反潛等任務。
它是名副其實的“外交明星艦”———自從編入現役，加入戰鬥序列以來，已經走過四大洲、三大洋，出訪過14個國家。2003年6月任艦長的朱建達，見證了其中大部分的出訪。如2003年10月15日～11月21日，“深圳”號與“青海湖”號綜合補給艦組成艦艇編隊，東出巴士海峽，歷時37天，總航程7000海里，成功地訪問了美國關島、新加坡和文萊，創下我國海軍首訪美國關島基地、文萊達魯撒蘭國的紀錄。
2005年11月8日～26日，“深圳”號與“微山湖”號綜合補給艦組成艦艇編隊，又由湛江港出發，航經5個海區、4個海峽，橫穿印度洋北部，進入阿拉伯海，往返歷時40多天，出訪巴基斯坦、印度、泰國三國，總航程近1萬海里。其間除與巴基斯坦、印度、泰國三國海軍進行友好交流外，還首次在異國海域與被訪國海軍舉行了以聯合搜救為主要內容的軍事演習。最新的一次出訪，是對日本的訪問。不過，對朱建達來說，迄今為止，出訪日本是其軍事外交的最高峰。“與過去幾次出訪不同，這次訪問日本引起的關注要大得多，我們剛到東京晴海碼頭時，空中有十幾架直升機在盤旋，都是進行航拍的日本媒體。”
朱建達也感覺到了這次訪問的特殊性，“從小我們就知道日本軍國主義對中國侵略的歷史，但現在我們應尊重歷史，面嚮未來，中日需要和平的交流，需要和諧、互信。”
“可以說細緻到了一個紐釦”
朱建達跟記者說起一個多世紀前中國艦隊的一次訪日。1891年6月，當時的清政府應日本政府邀請，北洋艦隊主力艦定遠、鎮遠、致遠、靖遠、經遠、來遠等6艘軍艦在著名將領丁汝昌的率領下，編隊從威海衛啟程前往日本。
當時，北洋艦隊從歐洲採購的先進軍艦讓日本人羡慕不已，驚嘆北洋水師的實力遠遠超過日本海軍。但當時清朝官兵紀律渙散，缺乏訓練，甚至有士兵在炮管上晾衣服。這在很大程度上刺激了日本朝野，促使其迅速擴充軍備。日本海軍在之後短短數年內發展成一支可與北洋水師相抗衡的海上力量，並最終在1894年的中日甲午海戰中打敗北洋水師。
時代不同了，現在的中國海軍是一支文明之師、威武之師。在這次出訪前，“深圳”號全體官兵做足了“功課”。“9月23日接到任務，有兩個月的準備時間。當時‘深圳’號剛好在廠里維修，我們對300多個零部件進行了檢查和修理，讓裝備處於良好的狀態。另外在訓練、禮儀、安全航行和操作等方面進行了精心準備。”
因為此前“深圳”號沒去過東京灣，因此官兵認真研究了東京港的航法，並吃透了在不良氣象中進港的航法。另外，針對可能出現的日本右翼勢力，相關的應對措施也事先對士兵進行了培訓。“可以說細緻到了一個紐釦。”“深圳”號一位上尉這樣對記者說。
實際上，準備工作不僅僅在普通的士兵中，海軍艦艇出訪指揮員、南海艦隊副司令員肖新年少將出訪前就看了不少有關日本的一些資料、書籍，包括有中央電視台的紀錄片《大國崛起》的日本部分、《列國志》中有關日本的部分，還有美國人寫的《菊與刀》之類的。
隨行補給艦不能進入日本領海
11月21日，“深圳”號全體官兵穿帥氣的07式禮服，從湛江港出發，正式開始訪日行程。他們要穿越台灣海峽，也要經過我國的春曉油田，最終到達東京灣。朱建達告訴記者，途中“深圳”號遇到了我國台灣地區的艦隊，也與美國“小鷹號”不期而遇。“同時還有一艘補給艦隨行，不過根據中日雙方的約定，隨行的補給艦不能進入日本領海，只能在公海上。”
經過7天的航行，11月28日上午10時，“深圳”號導彈驅逐艦在日本海上由日本自衛隊“雷”號護衛艦引導，緩緩駛進東京灣，停靠在晴海碼頭。10時15分，日方在碼頭為該艦舉行了隆重的歡迎儀式，肖新年和朱建達上校走下舷梯，與前來迎候的日本海上自衛隊參謀長吉川榮治上將等日方迎接人員熱烈握手。
這一握手，成為中日建交以來中國艦艇訪日“零”的突破。隨後，日本海上自衛隊參謀長吉川榮治上將說，中國海軍艦艇首次訪問日本，開啟了兩國防務領域交流的新篇章。肖新年少將表示，“深圳”號搭載的不僅僅是345名官兵，還滿載13億中國人民的友好情誼。
中國海軍軍艦首次訪日，吸引世界的目光，各國新聞媒體都以最快的速度給予高度關注。11月28日上午，當“深圳”號駛入東京灣時，晴海碼頭早已聚集了世界各國駐東京60多家媒體的150多名記者。
《人民海軍》報稱，“在人民海軍史上，這是一次非凡的出訪。”日本《朝日新聞》說，“定期交流不但能增進雙邊關係，軍事上的互信也會為亞洲整體的穩定創造良好的大環境”。
留學生打爆大使館電話
“深圳”號到達日本後，引起了各方的強烈關注，每天參觀的有幾千人。日本社會各界人士，特別是中國留學生都迫切希望一睹“神州第一艦”風采，他們幾乎快把我國駐日大使館的電話打爆，都申請能到軍艦上看一看。然而參觀時間有限，要求很難全部滿足。在東京留學的學生代表提出讓艦長朱建達給在日本留學的近10萬學生寫上幾句話。
當大使館的工作人員將這一情況通報朱艦長後，他二話沒說，激情地寫下這樣一段話：“‘深圳’號是我國自行設計製造的現代化程度較高的驅逐艦，是祖國經濟、科技高速發展的一個縮影……全艦官兵祝願你們早日學成歸國，實現遠大抱負!”很快，他的祝福就掛在留日學生網頁上，成為大家共勉的語句。
隨後幾天，一位特殊的人物也登上“深圳”號參觀，他名叫花園昭雄，93歲，曾經參加八路軍。一大早，老人就趕到晴海碼頭，等參觀軍艦。他撫摸軍艦甲板，潸然淚下，對水兵說：“在報紙上經常看到中國軍艦出訪，我做夢都希望中國的軍艦訪問日本，今天終於踩在中國這片流動國土上,我不僅聞到了中國山河的氣息，也看到了中國不斷強大的縮影。今天，連腰桿子也硬朗了許多!”
74歲高齡的日本老人奧秋登手持一面五星紅旗，一邊參觀一邊留影。這位曾在廣東擔任過日文教師的老人說，中國是一個美好的國度，瞭解中國的人都會喜歡中國。他要把中國海軍軍艦訪日的照片發給日夜思念的中國學生，記住這個見證中日友好的歷史時刻。
互相到對方軍艦“摸底”
中國海軍官兵每次出訪，都會與到訪國海軍官兵舉行多種形式的
交流活動。此次首訪日本，各種交流活動當然也少不了。據朱建達介紹，到訪東京當天，“深圳”號官兵就與擔負陪訪任務的日海上自衛隊“雷”號導彈驅逐艦官兵進行了坦誠的交流。
指揮員肖新年少將率部分官兵在日本海上自衛隊第一護衛隊司令河村正雄少將的陪同下，第一批登上日“雷”號驅逐艦參觀。
中方官兵聽取了“雷”艦艦長宮崎守的簡要介紹，然後來到甲板、機艙和駕駛室參觀。官兵們仔細觀看了導彈、火箭、火炮、雷達、電子戰等裝備，詢問了對方的生活、軍艦的性能、武器的威力……主人作了相應回答。與此同時，“雷”號艦的官兵也分批在“深圳”號上參觀。
“他們還是比較保守，把主要的裝備都蓋起來了，不過根據對等原則，我們都參觀了彼此的作戰指揮室。”朱建達說。據介紹，因為彼此是同行，雖是初次打交道，雙方士兵交談還是比較投機的。中國海軍艦艇首次訪日，讓兩國水兵都充滿了好奇。28日下午，中日雙方乾脆安排兩國水兵面對面座談———這是“深圳”號官兵歷次出訪中的第一次。
座談在“深圳”號軍官餐廳進行。雙方官兵坐在一起，話匣子很快打開了，交談的話題既有對各自文化的探源，也有對武器裝備和兵役制度的瞭解，還有對現實問題的關注。大家在坦誠友好的氣氛中交流了一個多小時。
由於訪問日程安排得很滿，時間非常緊張，雙方外事部門最後商定，雙方的文體友誼賽開展足球、拔河兩個項目。比賽不以國籍區分，而採取以雙方相同專業組成混合隊進行。
對於中國海軍的印象，負責陪同參觀的“雷”號艦的航空長清野少校說：“通過這幾天與‘深圳’號官兵近距離的接觸，發現中國海軍官兵不僅要求嚴格，而且素質全面，軍事知識特別廣博，這是我少見的。”
朱建達也對日本自衛隊留下了深刻的印象，他用這樣一句話概括：“裝備精良，訓練有素”。“與其他國家相比，日本自衛隊成員嚴謹的作風和敬業的精神與禮節值得我們學習。”
跨越南中國海和東京灣
12月1日，“深圳”號導彈驅逐艦對日本為期4天的訪問圓滿結束，駛離東京晴海碼頭，啟程回國。
對這次不平凡的訪問，海軍副參謀長張磊愚給予了很高的評價。他說，從南中國海的湛江港到日本的東京灣，“深圳”號駛過了中日關係史上一段不平凡的航程，也駛入了中日兩國防務領域交流的一個新階段。
張磊愚說，自上世紀80年代中期中國海軍艦艇走出國門以來，我國海軍迄今已28次派出艦艇或編隊，遠航太平洋、印度洋和大西洋，對世界5大洲的37個國家進行了友好訪問。中國軍艦在相繼成功訪問多個周邊國家之後，終於實現對日本的訪問，這也從一個側面凸顯出中日兩國在防務領域增進瞭解與互信的重要性和必要性。

“深圳”號訪日： 平和與複雜之旅

南方日報寫得較有趣，說是和平和複雜之旅，留意粗體部份，發覺中日關係，特別是軍方互相猜忌之深。
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南方日報 A06 深度 By 王雨吟劉潔瓊
2007-12-18
標示關鍵字

“深圳”號訪日： 平和與複雜之旅
□本報記者王雨吟實習生劉潔瓊湛江、廣州報道
南海艦隊副司令員肖新年：既不能把此次出訪當成純粹的外交手段，也不能過於樂觀地估計其對未來的輻射意義
應日本邀請，被譽為“神州第一艦”的導彈驅逐艦“深圳”號(舷號167)於11月28日至12月1日對日本進行了友好訪問。這是自中日甲午海戰以來，中國海軍艦艇首次在平等的條件下訪問日本。
“深圳”號自1999年4月服役，至今已代表中國海軍的國際形象遠航太平洋、印度洋和大西洋，對亞洲、非洲和歐洲的13個國家進行友好訪問。被譽為中國的“外交明星艦”，作為中國的流動領土，“深圳”號已為中國贏得了良好聲譽。
歸航湛江基地已近半月，這艘見多識廣的艦艇已重新開始常規軍事生活。那麼，平靜下來的他們，如何總結這次出訪?南方日報記者走進南海艦隊，訪問“深圳”號官兵，體味“深圳”號訪日之旅的快樂與沉重。
朱建達上世紀60年代出生在江蘇張家港。18歲應徵入伍。兩年後，被大連艦艇學院錄取；1995年，在廣州艦艇學院研究生班進修；2002年，又進入陸軍指揮學院學習。
2001年9月登上“深圳”號任見習艦長，一年半後轉正。是目前中國少數的特級艦長之一。
“深圳”號艦長朱建達上校：“ 中日海上防衛力量有諸多相似之處”
“他們反潛能力較強，我們反艦能力較強”
“我們在日本晴海碼頭停靠大約花費數百萬元人民幣，等到日本軍艦回訪的時候，我們也將相應按照對等原則收取相關費用。”
南方日報：我們知道您在“深圳”號訪日期間，也上了日本的“村雨”級“雷”號導彈驅逐艦，並進入了他們的作戰指揮中心，您能否比較一下兩艘艦艇的裝備和管理情況?
朱建達：總的來說是各有長短，他們的反潛能力強，我們的反艦能力強。我們的“深圳”號是1999年開始服役的，他們的“雷”號是2001年開始服役，服役時間差不多，都可能不是最先進的艦艇。
但我們也注意到，日本的艦艇護衛艦一般服役15年，驅逐艦服役20年，潛艇每隔10年更新換代一次，雖然總體規模不大，但武器更新速度非常快。
不容否認的是，日本海上自衛隊近年來發展得非常快，實力也很強。
如果僅僅就“深圳”號和“雷”號比較來說，中日雙方作戰能力則是各有長短的。
日本艦艇的大多數裝備來自美國的支持，但他們在本土化方面做得非常好，在許多細節的設計方面，體現人文關懷，比較精緻。如他們艦上的船梯和欄杆扶手，都做了防滑處理。
他們的武器裝備也堪稱精良。
從他們的管理體制來看，我們兩國之間也存在極大共通性，我們對裝備的維護、保養都採取落實到人的責任制，小到螺絲釘都掛扎相關負責人的銘牌，管理的相似性非常高。不像西方的艦艇上，裝備非常先進，但往往?跡斑斑。
所以說，技術的互補和管理文化的共通，使得中日兩國開展海上防務力量交流和合作的前景非常廣闊。
南方日報：聽說這次出訪本來是計劃觀看日本最先進的“宙斯盾”艦的，但後來日本方面臨時改變了主意，最後參觀的是日方的補給艦，原因現在明朗了麼?
朱建達：參觀日方艦艇是由中日雙方事先協商確定的，當然根據對等原則，日方回訪我們的時候，中國也不會把最好的艦艇開放參觀。
我們在日本晴海碼頭停靠大約花費數百萬元人民幣，等到日本軍艦回訪的時候，我們也將相應按照對等原則收取相關費用等量規格接待收費。
“深圳”號見證海上多邊合作升溫
“2007年，我們終於開進了東京灣。這是一次沒有實現軍中高層互訪的情況下的軍艦交流，是中日關係改善給外界的一個非常重要的信號，標誌意義不容小視。”
南方日報：朱艦長，您伴隨“深圳”號的成長已有6年時間了，在這6年間，“深圳”號出色完成多次中外艦艇交流任務，成為軍中的“外交明星”，您能具體談一談這幾年來，您所參與見證的世界海洋力量多邊合作從無到有，從少到多的過程麼?
朱建達：我只能從“深圳”號幾年來的出訪見聞來談談這個問題。海軍是國際性的軍種，國與國之間的艦艇交流，一直是國際外交關係冷熱的晴雨表。艦艇這一流動國土的出訪，對於加深被訪國對本國海上力量的直觀印象，效果非常好。
2003年，“深圳”號出訪新加坡，當時美國艦艇也在同一港口停靠，因為“9·11”事件的影響，美國艦隊表現出高度警惕，艦艇前後兩挺機關槍，也不邀請別人上來，別人也不想上去，他們也開甲板招待會啊，冷餐會啊，冷冷清清，氣氛始終熱烈不起來。
因為停泊在同一港口，“深圳”號和澳大利亞、法國、泰國等12個國家的艦艇展開的交流活動非常頻繁熱鬧，相形之下，美國人在那個港口顯得挺孤單。
2005年，“深圳”號出訪巴基斯坦、印度和泰國，並進行聯合軍事演習。當時我們的演習項目主要是海上搜救、直升機互降、海上補給、通信操練、援救受損艦艇等。
具體過程，還是挺能體現互助合作精神的，當時我們把假人扔到海里，讓大家搜救，因為風浪比較大，巴基斯坦海軍救人就非常吃力，但印度海軍則表現出訓練有素和堅毅執的性格，非要把假人撈起來。
我們還進行了燈光信號的操演，旗語的交流，項目不算複雜，但通過演習，各國的訓練水平均得體現，彼此的溝通、信任和理解，到了一個新的層次。
2007年，我們終於開進了東京灣。這是中日關係改善給外界的一個非常重要的信號，標誌意義不容小視。
融冰之旅，磕碰總是難免，但我們均以平和心態一一化解，外軍對“深圳”號的總體評價良好，我們較好地展示了人民海軍威武之師、文明之師、勝利之師、和平之師的良好形象。
艦員的良好個人素質，整潔的艦容艦貌都給外軍展示出這是一支訓練有素的部隊，是可以打勝仗的隊伍。
我覺得此次訪日最具有未來輻射意義的成果是，雙方都有意建立一個海上聯絡機制，通過電話，在海上進行溝通聯絡。
如果這一點能夠實現，將減少雙方在原因不明情況下由於信息交流不順暢造成誤會，給中日海上力量增進瞭解，促進合作，加強彼此的信任，打造出了一個務實的平台。
這減少了“春曉”油氣田海域、釣魚島海域等敏感區域因原因不明而造成衝突的可能。
南方日報：中日海上關係的改善，對於台海局勢有何影響?
朱建達：將有利台灣問題的最終解決。
南方日報：我們注意到10月17日，美國推出了《21世紀海上力量合作戰略》，您如何評價這份報告中，對中國海軍實力的評估?我們也看到這份報告中，對於未來海上力量的合作，突出強調了軟實力、文化交流、多邊安全合作的重要性，那麼對於多年擔任這項任務的中國海軍艦艇艦長，您如何評論他們的觀點?
朱建達：對於前一個問題，我只能說，中國海軍力量的壯大發展對世界海洋安全不構成任何威脅。
至於對於海洋力量多邊合作、軟實力競爭、文化交流確已成為新時期世界海洋力量格局的重要特徵，從“深圳”號的見聞來看，多邊交流、多邊合作正在不斷推進，證實了這一點。
美國的報告中指出，世界90%的商業運輸通過海洋。對中國來說，通過馬六甲海峽的5萬艘船隻之中，有70%左右和中國相關。
在此前提下，和平至關重要，交流與合作自然成為海上力量最重要的相處方式。
我們進港時，8架直升機在頭上盤旋
“他們是日本媒體派來搶拍中國海軍進港照片的，他們表現出來的強烈好奇心，給我們留下很深刻的印象。”
南方日報：此次訪日，對日本的軍政界和民眾的反應可否滿意?
朱建達：日本軍政界對“深圳”號的來訪，高度重視，精心準備，整體氣氛是在和平前提下的友好謹慎，日本軍人有相當好的保持低調和高度的敬業精神。
我上到他們的“村雨”級“雷”號導彈驅逐艦時發現，設備上的銘牌，統統用錫紙細心地包起來，遮蔽掉了，因為軍用設施上的銘牌，對於軍界的人來說，常常可以一望而知出產地和年份，那他們提前把這些可以透露信息的部分保護起來了，我們覺得這個細節，證明瞭他們的謹慎、細心和敬業。
我們有兩個小時左右的購物時間，就便裝進入日本平民社會。日本給人的感覺是文明程度非常高，打動我最深的是日本人對環保的執認真，馬路抽煙的男人，會掏出一個隨身攜帶的煙灰缸，抽完把煙頭放進煙灰缸，放進口袋繼續揣。
我們靠的碼頭是民用港，水域、碼頭、設施齊全，港口排污完全符合國際標準。馬路上出奇地清潔，也很少堵車，我們感覺這是一個自尊心極強的民族。
在莊嚴樂聲中我們的軍艦徐徐靠岸，軍容軍姿無可挑剔，確實非常鼓舞人心。我們靠岸要先穿過一座彩虹橋，從那裡開始，我們的頭上就盤旋了大約8架直升機，他們是日本媒體派來搶拍中國海軍進港照片的，他們表現出來的強烈好奇心，給我們留下很深刻的印象。
南方日報：中國艦艇訪日，讓中國許多人深有感觸地回望歷史，上個世紀初，中國艦艇也曾在相當屈辱的情形之下，到過日本，對此番中國軍艦的到訪，日本民眾是不是也有這種敏感性?
朱建達：我想這個問題可以從我們華僑的態度中得到側面解答。他們生活在日本社會中，能夠切身感受我們此次訪日所輻射的能量——有一位老華僑，上船來參觀了一番之後，連連說“揚眉吐氣啊，揚眉吐氣，我們中國人的腰桿子又直了。”
11月28日，東京灣晴海碼頭，熱鬧非凡。
當地時間上午10時，“深圳”號導彈驅逐艦在日本海上自衛隊“雷”號護衛艦引導下，緩緩駛進東京灣，停靠晴海碼頭，開始對日本為期72小時的訪問。
對於“深圳”號來講，這只是出訪經歷中的十四分之一，但是這次卻實現了中日建交35周年來中國艦艇訪日“零”的突破。
“軍事互信”凸顯出訪建設性
身07式海軍服的“深圳”艦官兵在甲板上列隊站坡。
在連續7晝夜航行中經受了風浪洗禮的“深圳”艦，艦容整潔一新，官兵精神振奮，以良好素質和形象出現在日本國民面前。
出訪指揮員、南海艦隊副司令員肖新年少將，“深圳”號艦長朱建達上校走下舷梯，與前來迎候的日本海上自衛隊參謀長吉川榮治上將等熱烈握手。
隨中日海軍軍官的手緊緊握在一起，結束的是甲午海戰以來中日兩國軍艦無平等條件下互訪活動的歷史。開啟的則是兩國防務領域交流的新篇章。
“此次訪問之所以能夠突破，首先當然是孕育於中日關係迅速回暖的前提之下。”
肖新年少將在接受採訪時說，在此背景下，“深圳”號成功訪問日本，不僅標志兩國關係發展到了一個新階段，同時，通過訪問增進了雙方的政治和軍事互信。
“軍事互信”四個字道出了這一事件最具建設性的一點。這幾年，中國威脅論甚囂塵上；而日本得益於對台灣問題的曖昧立場，在大陸和台灣之間，盡享漁翁之利。
中日之間的軍事信任度非常低，採取行動，提高中日兩國在海上防務力量之間的溝通和交流，開展國際海上力量之間的多邊合作，無疑是順應潮流之舉。
“你們總算來了”
時至今日，中日恩怨早已非三言兩語能夠說清。1894年中日甲午戰爭爆發，日本一舉打敗了清政府的北洋水師，從而也掀開了中日關係史最難以擺脫的沉重一頁。
其後，特別是隨日本發動侵華戰爭，中日之間積怨日深。雖然1972年中日邦交開始正常化，但防衛領域交流一直是中日雙邊關係中的相當敏感的“雷區”，遠遠落後於經濟、文化等方面的交流，也落後於中國與其他國家的防衛交流。
“深圳”號此次出訪成功，有人覺得有理由為之欣喜若狂，有中國媒體報道說，登艦參觀的老華僑，為戰艦所體現的中國工業化建設成就欣慰得淚流滿面並表示“你們總算來了。”
鳳凰衛視認為，“深圳號”成功訪日反映了中日兩國的平等關係，也反映了中日兩國高層追求和平和友好的基調，並相信中國民眾看到自己的現代化軍艦訪問日本肯定是百感交集的。
日本《東京新聞》、《每日新聞》和《朝日新聞》等主流媒體均發表社論對中國海軍的來訪表示歡迎，他們希望通過不斷的軍事交流消除兩國之間在防務領域的不信任感，避免因缺乏瞭解而引發的各種糾紛。
更有海外媒體評論認為，此舉為兩國關係跨越的關鍵。
“不能把‘深圳’號訪日當成純粹的外交手段”
和媒體的熱鬧形成鮮明對比的是我國軍方清醒審視的態度。南海艦隊副司令員肖新年告訴南方日報記者，南海艦隊始終對此次出訪保持冷靜頭腦，中國國家利益長期以來比較穩定，而日本因為首相更替頻繁，對中國政策增添了不少不穩定因素。因此既不能把此次“深圳”號訪日當成純粹的外交手段，也不能過於樂觀地估計此次訪日對未來的輻射意義。
“深圳”號士兵在日本享受到前所未有的高規格待遇，他們之中許多人要求和防衛大臣石破茂一一合影，石破茂有求必應，事後中國士兵說：“我們想不到他會那麼友好耐心。”
石破茂在和人握手的時候，會在手中放一塊紀念幣，握手之後，就留在我們士兵的手心裡。
以上種種，確實給對中日友好前景寄予希望的人以強烈的快樂。但我們不能不注意到，在這場中日融冰之旅中，也不斷發生磕磕絆絆，使增進友誼的步伐顯得沉重。
廣為人知的是，此前因小泉參拜靖國神社，中國軍艦首次訪日計劃夭折。
猜疑與隔閡由始至終沒有消弭———
有傳聞說，有參觀日方“宙斯盾”艦的計劃，也被中途取消，代之以參觀一艘補給艦；
原定於在東京舉行公開露面活動，同樣被中途取消；
甚至有人在歡迎碼頭的一側，看到日本右翼勢力所打的大幅反對標語；
“我們登上日本軍艦，發現艦上所有的銘牌都用錫紙細細地封了起來，以防被窺破生產地和生產日期……”“深圳”號艦長朱建達說。
也許“深圳”號上一位普通士兵的話比任何高官言論更能反映這一熱點中當事人的真正感受，當記者問及作為中國軍艦一員首訪日本心情如何時，一士兵答道：“心情複雜，心態平和。”
這至少是一個良好開端
如果雙方都已學會如何在複雜中保持平和，中日關係將真正迎來成熟、理智的春天。
這次“破冰之航”到底會把中日關係引嚮何方?現在還不可能有一個明確的答案。
但面對預料內外的波折與崎嶇，穩定性的因素來自於對雙方根本利益與戰略形勢的深刻認識和把握。
肖新年透露，中日建立海上聯絡機制，就是由日本在安倍時代主動提出的，日方認為中美中韓已經建立較為順暢的聯絡機制，中日之間不應該獨缺，此提議得到中方的熱情回應，建立中日海上聯絡機制，在“深圳”號訪日期間，得到雙方高調支持，是極具建設性的。
不管怎樣，中國軍艦的成功訪日，至少表明中日兩國已認識到了加強兩國政治、軍事互信的重要性，並都表達出了努力的意願，這至少是一種理性的態度，一個良好的開端。
“培養兩國軍事互信，應從基層做起，以此次‘深圳’號訪日為起點。”肖新年認為，有第一次就有第二次，第三次，寸土終能壘起高台。
據傳聞，日本已決定在2008年上半年派遣海上自衛隊艦隻到中國訪問。
“深圳”號身世
“深圳”號是我國051B型導彈驅逐艦，1995年12月在大連造船廠開工建造，1997年10月下水，1999年加入南海艦隊。
其主要任務是攻擊水面艦艇與潛艇，並有較強的單艦防禦能力。該艦還首次裝備編隊指揮系統，有較強的編隊指揮能力和綜合作戰能力。
主要武器：反艦導彈：4座四聯裝C-802發射架，射程為120公里(66海里)；艦空導彈：1座HQ-7(紅旗-7)8聯裝發射架(備彈24枚)；反潛導彈：兩座四聯裝長纓-1(CY-1)反潛導彈發射架，射程18公里

美《中國安全》季刊分析 中國謹慎應對美海洋戰略

環球時報 06 關注中國
2007-12-18
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美《中國安全》季刊分析 中國謹慎應對美海洋戰略
美國《中國安全》季刊最新一期文章，原題：中國對美國海洋戰略的初步反應毫無疑問，美國是最具海洋安全利害關係的國家。至於中國，2006年中國海洋業產出約為2700億美元，到2020年可能達到1萬億。這種海洋經濟變革越來越離不開海洋安全。中國愈來愈關注海上安全和貿易，因為這攸關其“和平發展”的計劃。
新時代美中兩國在公海如何互動將不僅關係到各自的將來，而且影響到全球秩序。隨一份新的海洋戰略不久前出台，美國開始醞釀新的海洋安全途徑，而中國對此的反應將極大影響這個戰略的方向，甚至可能是它的成敗。
海洋戰略的新方向最初見於“千艦海軍”計劃。其後，美國首次整合海軍、海軍陸戰隊及海岸警衛隊三大海上力量，出台了戰略文件《21世紀海上力量合作戰略》。
自新戰略推出以來，中國對它反應謹慎。從媒體的報道可略窺中國對美國海洋戰略的可能評估。幾乎所有中國作者都指出一點：“所謂的國際合作”只是為了美國海上力量的全球部署。說得更直接的則懷疑美國的意圖。許多中國觀察家認為美國的軍事行動特別用於“遏制”中國。
不過，盡管其媒體充滿質疑，中國已開始與美國在一些海洋安全行動上合作。新一波的合作已從政府走廊延伸到太平洋。鑒於台灣問題的敏感性，美中海軍力量很可能在將來不幸的戰爭中直接打交道。因而，兩國海上力量合作(特別是海軍之間)以改善關係就具有了強烈動力。
盡管中國在言論上保持謹慎、對沖的手法，低調但具體的海上合作卻在進行。然而一些關鍵問題如台灣、美國對中國戰略意圖的擔憂仍在妨礙這種合作的擴大。美國的新海洋戰略無法改變中國對其基本利益的看法。重要的是，美國必須尋求使中國相信，新戰略的意圖和目標是實實在在的，並不像許多中國人認為的是“遏製”中國的掩飾。▲(作者安德魯·埃里克森，汪北哲譯)